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I. INTRODUCTION 
that is unsolicited e-mail to a large number of 
nts, is generally recognized as an increasingly 
ing and costly issue for electronic business and 
t traffic. Companies, non-profit organizations, and 
uals receive this kind of e-mail to such an extent 
 issue has certainly gone beyond what is merely 
ing”. More than two-thirds of the world-wide e-
 categorized as spam: Symantec reports  that the 
age of spam e-mails reached 67% in December 
 106 billion e-mails were scanned – and continues 
 at a fairly steady rate. However, by January 2005 
nth later – the total volume of e-mail increased by 
19% over the preceding month [1]. MessageLabs 
ced that the average global ratio of spam was even 
an 81% in December 2004, although the sample of 
 inspected was much smaller, comprising some 
 per day [2]. The content of spam e-mails covers a 
ange of topics: spammers’ e-mails mainly offer or 
se general goods and services (23% of all e-mails 
ized as spam), contain references or offers related 
ey, the stock market or other financial 
tunities" (15%), contain or refer to products or 
s intended for persons above the age of 18 (14%), 
 or advertise health-related products and services 
 The increased payload of networks and e-mail 
 and also the consumption of employees’ attention 
and time is not the only harm spam e-mails cause. 
Fraudulent messages, e.g. e-mails that appear to be from a 
well-known company but are not, also known as "brand 
spoofing" or "phishing" e-mails, are often used to trick 
users into revealing personal information such as e-mail 
addresses, financial information and passwords (16%). 
Furthermore, viruses, worms, and Trojan horses (opening 
backdoors for botnets using the infected computer as 
spam client) are distributed over the Internet. The 
economic damage caused in total by spam e-mails is 
estimated at several billion US$ [3].  
 
This central economic aspect motivated anti-spam 
activities embracing many facets: national laws and 
international regulations –  
http://notebook.ifas.ufl.edu/spam/Legislation.htm) 
provides a good overview – , organizational provisions 
including abuse systems (e.g. http://spam.abuse.net/) and 
lists of suspicious domains and IP numbers, and technical 
solutions mainly applying blocking, filtering, or 
authenticating mechanisms [4]. However, statistics and e-
mail users’ daily experience show that the spam problem 
is far from being solved. Nevertheless, the application of 
technical anti-spam is necessary and has prevented our 
Internet e-mail system from collapsing. 
 
Alongside these mainstream activities efforts to analyze 
spammers behaviour or to even attack them have come up 
implementing honeypots and honeynets [5,6]. The 
honeypot presented in this paper contributes to this field 
by setting up a technical environment that allows to 
analyze where spammers get their e-mail addresses from 
and how they exploit them (or if they simply use any 
harvested e-mail address). 
Guido Schryen 
II. MOTIVATION AND GOALS 
Valid e-mail addresses belong to the most valuable 
resources of spammers, and identifying address sources 
and spammers’ exploiting procedures is crucial to 
preventing from getting addresses and from misusing 
them.  It is widely known that beside generating addresses 
with brute force mechanisms, spammers get valid e-mail 
addresses from harvesting the Internet or, illegally, from 
organizations. Some address obscuring techniques (AOT) 
restricting the availability and usability of e-mail 
addresses have been proposed : already in 1997 Hall 
described e-mail channels [7], and single-purpose 
addresses encapsulating policy in the address were 
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presented by  Ioannidis in 2003 [8]. Many users also use 
temporary addresses and abolish them when they feel that 
the spam portion has become too high. 
 
Gaining insight into spammers’ ways to obtain and 
(mis)use e-mail addresses is useful in many ways:  
 
? Assessment of the effectiveness of AOT and 
input for their improvement 
 
? Identification of spammers leading to their 
prosecution 
 
? Assessment of the usability and necessity of 
hiding e-mail addresses on the Internet 
 
? Discovery of specific marketing and addressing 
activities 
 
The last item aims at the quality of e-mail addresses. 
Spammers are known to collect as many valid e-mail 
addresses as possible but little is known about spammers’ 
capabilities and interest in carefully directed, consumer-
oriented marketing. A taxonomy of quality for e-mail 
addresses is shown in figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Taxonomy of e-mail addresses 
 
The inner ellipses are more valuable for spammers than 
the outer ones due to their losses caused by non-selective 
advertising . Only a portion of collected or generated e-
mail addresses are valid ones, i.e. e-mails addressed to 
non-valid ones are refused by the addressee’s host as 
these mailboxes do not exist. The valid ones can be 
divided in used addresses and those that are no longer 
accessed and thus useless for spammers. A way to 
distinguish between the two is provided by an opt-out 
option included in some spam e-mails, which when used 
incautiously by the spam recipient indicates that the 
address is in use. Spammers can even go a step further 
when adopting physical marketing strategies using 
knowledge about consumer-specific interests and 
behaviour: for example, an Internet user participating 
actively in a German discussion group that focuses on 
medical products is presumably interested in medical 
product offers in the German language. The innermost 
ellipse contains the e-mail addresses belonging to users 
who buy products and and, thus, from whom the spammer 
profits. 
 
The goal of  the honeypot presented in this paper is (1) to 
penetrate spammers’ behavior in harvesting e-mail 
addresses from Internet services such as newsgroups and 
the web and  (2) in discovering the extent to which  
spammers have already shifted from simply employing 
used e-mail addresses towards acquiring addresses of  
users likely to be interested (specific marketing). 
III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In order to cover a broad range of locations which are 
attractive for spammers to harvest e-mail addresses it is 
necessary to inspect many Internet services. Integrated in 
this honeypot are newsletters/mailing lists, web pages, 
web chats, ICQ chat, and the Usenet  in which e-mail 
addresses are placed. In order to detect language- and/or 
region-specific particularities each of these mediums is 
split up into German (language) oriented ones and US-
based ones which, as a second dimension, renders the 
study readily extensible to other languages and regions. 
To allow inspecting spammers’ behavior regarding 
specific marketing activities a third dimension of the 
survey focuses on the topic of the Internet service. For 
example, web pages and newsletters/mailing lists are 
divided into those ruled by an individual, a discussion 
board, greeting card service etc; for a complete list of 
topics see annex A in which the topics are grouped by 
types administration, content, connection, context and 
commerce. It should be noted that topics are service-
specific. Figure 2 shows the classification of Internet 
locations as used in the empirical study. Each type of 
location is represented by a cube, each cube  contains 
three locations (a location is a specific web side or a 
specific newsletter), each location gets four addresses (de-
, com-, net-, and org-address), i.e. for each cube 12 e-mail 
addresses have to be reserved. This procedure allows to 
detect if the top level domain of an e-mail address is 
relevant. So far, German and US newsletters/mailing lists 
and web pages have been addressed for almost all topics 
listed in annex A, i.e. the number of e-mail addresses 
placed for getting harvested is almost 2*2*36*12 which is 
1728. Of course, no e-mail address must be seeded more 
than once. 
 
 
collected, generated 
valid 
used 
interested 
ordering 
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Figure 2: Classification of Internet locations 
 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION  
A mail server has been set up, namely 
charlie.winfor.rwth-aachen.de, and three domains have 
been reserved, wforasp.com, wforasp.net, and 
wforasp.org for covering e-mail addresses of four top 
level domains. All e-mails addressed to these domains are 
directed to this mail server. As thousands of e-mail 
addresses had to be created they were generated 
automatically by using a random generator for the user 
part of the addresses. In order to prevent e-mail addresses 
from being guessed or generated with brute force attacks 
it is necessary to define them randomly as well as to give 
them an appropriate number of characters. An example of 
an e-mail addresss created this way is 
wasp10208@wforasp.com.  
 
The Internet locations serving as lures were chosen 
manually just as the placement of the e-mail addresses 
had to be done manually. As soon as an e-mail address is 
spread, its location and activation date is stored. 
 
All incoming e-mails are classified into regular e-mails 
(ham e-mails), e.g. regular newsletters or such containing 
comments from users of discussion forums, and spam e-
mails. This procedure is currently mainly executed by 
humans but supported by a mail parser (written in PHP) 
which uses an increasing white list containing pairs of 
(recipient-address, IP) entries: each time a host was 
manually assessed qualified to send an e-mail to recipient-
address, its IP number is linked to this e-mail address and 
stored in the white list. A second task of the mail parser is 
to decompose each incoming e-mail: all entries of the 
header are analyzed as well as the content and the 
(MIME) structure of the body. A detailed description of 
the (relational) data model the procedure is based on is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Next, the e-mails’ 
elements are stored in the (MySql) database broken down 
into spam and ham e-mails. The database is intended to be 
used by data mining tools and (simpler) statistical 
analyzers. Figure 3 provides a survey of the 
implementation infrastructure. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Infrastructure of the e-mail honeypot environment 
V. FIRST EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Due to the early stage of the project the results presented 
here are preliminary and include only numbers of spam 
and ham e-mails received in different categories. In total, 
7968 ham e-mails and 2482 spam e-mails have been 
recorded by our mail server. Table 1 shows the results for 
(e-mail addresses placed in) newletters/mailing lists and 
on web pages. The first column represents the service 
(nl/ml=newletters/mailing lists; wp=web pages), the 
column “tld location” refers to the dimension “country”, 
“topics” classifies according to the topics given in annex 
A. “addressees” refers to the top level domain of the e-
mail address placed in the locations. The entry “--” 
indicates that no spam e-mails arrived in the respective 
category. For example, the highlighted entry  refers to the 
number of spam e-mails that were directed to addresses 
used for subscribing US administration 
newsletters/mailings lists. 19 spam e-mails were received 
in total, 17 of them sent to com-addresses, one to an org- 
and one to a net-address. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
topic 
services 
country 
Germany United States 
newsletters/ 
mailing lists 
web pages 
ICQ chat 
Usenet 
web chats 
service-specific 
three locations each of them getting
a de-, a com-, a net-, an org-address 
mail parser 
Internet 
addresses and 
locations 
ham e-mails spam e-mails 
database 
mail server 
e-mail
ham and spam e-mails 
data miner statistical analyzer
white list 
manual processing 
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topics all [2;7] [8;11] [12;18] [19;20] [21;36] 
service 
tld 
location addressees all de net 
org com 
all de com 
org net 
all de com 
org net 
all de com 
org net 
all de com 
org net 
all de com 
org net 
de  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
nl/ml 
com 
 19 -- 17 
1  1 
19 -- 17 
1  1  -- -- -- -- 
de 
 515 76 108 
211  120 
240 20 40 
107  73 
5 2 2 
1  0 
7 2 3 
1  1 
81 45 18 
12  6 
182 7 45 
90  40 
wp 
com 
 1803 311 656
537  299 
860 123 299
298  140 
409 106 124
111  68 
-- -- 
534 82 233 
128  91 
Table 1: Number of spam e-mails received on addresses placed on web pages or used for newsletter/mailing list subscription 
 
Although the project is in a very early stage, some facts 
seem worth being mentioned: 
 
? No spam has been sent to addresses that were 
used for subscribing German newsletters/mailing 
lists. 
 
? Only a few spam e-mails have been received due 
to US newsletter/mailing list subscription. The 
few ones are all due to administration topics. 
 
? Not surprisingly, many more spam e-mails arise 
from placements on web pages.  Interestingly, 
German web pages caused only a third of the 
number of spam e-mails that are due to US web 
pages. Independent of the country, net-addresses 
seem to be more interesting for spammers than 
de- and org-addresses, on US web sites com-
addresses have been even more used by 
spammers. 
VI. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
Spammers are known to collect as many valid e-mail 
addresses as possible but little is known about spammers’ 
capabilities and interest in carefully directed, consumer-
oriented marketing. Gaining insight into spammers’ ways 
to obtain and (mis)use e-mail addresses is useful for the 
assessment of the effectiveness of AOT and input for their 
improvement, for identification of spammers leading to 
their prosecution, for assessment of the usability and 
necessity of hiding e-mail addresses on the Internet, and 
the discovery of specific marketing and addressing 
activities. The paper presents a honeypot  to penetrate 
spammers’ behavior in harvesting e-mail addresses from 
Internet services such as newsgroups and the web and  in 
discovering the extent to which  spammers have already 
shifted from simply employing used e-mail addresses 
towards acquiring addresses of  users likely to be 
interested (specific marketing). The honeypot’s 
conceptual framework classifies Internet locations as used 
in the empirical study using three dimensions: Internet 
services (e.g. the Usenet, web pages, newsletters), 
service-specific topics such as education, infotainment, 
and auctions, and countries. Each location gets four 
addresses (de-, com-, net-, and org-address) allowing to 
detect if the top level domain of an e-mail address is 
relevant for spammers. When e-mails arrive at the 
honeypot’s mail server they are classified into spam and 
ham e-mails (regular e-mails), decomposed by a parser, 
and stored in a database that is intended to be used by data 
mining tools and (simpler) statistical analyzers. 
Preliminary results of the honeypot study are presented 
showing that no spam has been sent to addresses that were 
used for subscribing German newsletters/mailing lists, 
only a few spam e-mails have been received due to US 
newsletter/mailing list subscription, many more spam e-
mails arise from placements on web pages, and net- as 
well as com-addresses seem to be especially interesting 
for spammers. 
 
The project is at an early stage. More services and 
countries have to be integrated, and to allow more reliable 
results and to apply time-series analysis more data have to 
be collected. Another branch to be extended is the 
functional part, i.e. the application of data mining 
procedures and statistic procedures aiming at detecting 
differences between spam and ham e-mails. They can be 
used for the improvement of spam filters. 
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ANNEX A 
class No Topic 
 1 personal web page (not 
included yet) 
2 departments, authorities, offices 
3 federations, unions 
4 social welfare organizations 
5 churches, sects 
6 associations, clubs 
administration 
7 institutions of education 
8 information 
9 entertainment 
10 education 
content 
11 infotainment 
12 discussion board 
13 peer-to-peer (not the service 
itself) 
14 chats (not the service itself) 
15 greeting cards 
16 Internet providers 
17 community providers 
connection 
18 (content) mobile providers 
19 search engines, web catalogues 
context 
20 meta search engines 
21 auctions 
22 payment 
23 logistics and transport 
24 web portals 
25 shops, malls 
26 finance, insurances 
27 tourism 
28 jobs 
29 motor vehicles 
30 property 
31 social contacts 
32 health 
33 gambling, lottery 
34 adult material 
35 (computer) hardware 
commerce 
36 software 
 
Topics specific to the services „newsletter/mailing lists“ and “web 
pages“ 
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